

# Inclusionary Zoning Primer

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*Cover photo of Luminaira at Parasol Park, photo courtesy of Tsutumida Pictures*

# Executive Summary and Introduction

Millions of American families struggle to find housing at a price they can afford as the gap between incomes and the cost of housing grows larger every year. Many families are forced to commute long distances, pay a disproportionate share of their incomes on housing, or live in housing that does not meet their needs.

The reasons for this gap are many. Local governments have developed plans that foster job growth but do not provide sufficient housing for workers, and some discourage or limit multifamily housing. Elaborate planning and zoning schemes, or outdated ones, make it difficult to develop land and a variety of housing types, especially the affordable housing needed to keep up with demand. Complex, lengthy, and uncertain development approval processes, fees imposed on new housing and environmental requirements constrain the availability of developable land and drive up the cost of housing. Those resisting higher density development (often referred to as NIMBY groups) have become more sophisticated and organized over time to deter growth and development.

As a result, the housing affordability gap is a multi-dimensional problem; it demands the use of many different tools and a comprehensive strategy to successfully meet the varied needs of people on different steps of the income ladder, from very low income to above median income. It calls for a combination of approaches that either increase income, reduce costs, or both. Different market segments may require different tools for improving affordability, from direct or indirect subsidies, to better planning for housing and regulatory barriers removal. The underlying causes of the affordability shortfall and the nature of a local market will dictate the strategies that will work best. However, there is no silver bullet strategy that can address it all in every market.

Many communities have come to rely on inclusionary zoning (IZ) as a simple, expedient requirement to show they are addressing affordability without examining the local causes or having to understand the complexities and diversity of housing needs and the market. By requiring developers to subsidize a certain percentage of affordable units within market-rate developments, IZ shifts the public and community burden for the affordability problem to the private sector.

Since the 2008 Great Recession there has been a renewed interest in IZ as communities across the United States are concerned about affordability. IZ as it exists has a legacy as a planning tool, however, there has been anecdotal but little empirical research on its effectiveness, best practices or its effect on housing supply and prices. As a result, NAHB obtained credentialed consultant research reports on inclusionary zoning to help fill this information gap; all are available at [www.nahb.org](http://www.nahb.org) by searching on the report titles noted in this paper.

## Price and Production Effects

A February 2008 study for NAHB, "[Housing Market Impacts of Inclusionary Zoning](#)" by Bento et al., examined price and production effects of IZ. Based on data from California, the report did not find an increase in overall housing production from IZ and concluded that IZ acts like a tax on housing. It also found a drop in single-family housing production, with a shift to multifamily. This is a problem because the building industry is still specialized—it is difficult for builders and developers to be able to do both types of production because the construction involved in horizontal versus vertical development is so different.

Other studies, including "[Silver Bullet or Trojan Horse: The Effects of Inclusionary Zoning on Local Housing Markets](#)" by Schuetz et al., found that IZ constrains all new housing development and that it puts upward pressure on single-family home prices. Further, the middle class gets squeezed out under IZ as they are no longer able to afford market-priced units, whose price has now increased to cover the subsidized IZ units, while neither being eligible for the subsidized ones. IZ shifts the problem without solving it.

Part of the appeal of IZ is that it presumably gives lower income households access to better neighborhoods and services by mixing subsidized and market-rate units. However, IZ puts renters into homes without allowing them to gain equity in most cases, making them no better off. In addition, many neighbors resist the mixed income/housing concept.

## Statutory, Implementation, Effectiveness Issues & Latest Reports

NAHB's funded research, the "[National Survey of Statutory Authority and Practical Considerations for the Implementation of Inclusionary Zoning](#)", in June 2007 by Shipman & Goodwin LLP, provides a national perspective on inclusionary zoning ordinances based on a review of state statutes and ordinances across the country. States vary in how they authorize the use of IZ, from implicit to express enabling authority. Seven states have no express authority; two states prohibit mandatory inclusionary zoning (Oregon and Texas); in two states inclusionary zoning ordinances have been invalidated as conflicting with statewide rent control laws; and 26 states have no express or implied authorization in their enabling statutes, so the authority is dependent on home rule powers.

Issues regarding statutory, implementation, and effectiveness need to be carefully reviewed for a community attempting to adopt IZ; as a complex market intervention, IZ requires additional paired interventions to go beyond simply setting long term affordability periods to be effective.

Most IZ ordinances offer incentives such as density bonuses, parking reductions, and expedited review procedures in an effort to avoid a takings claim and also allow the developer to recoup some of his or her subsidy to the lower priced units. Implementing these incentives is not always achievable in today's development approval process however, and do not make up for the subsidized costs. It is difficult to obtain the density theoretically allowed by zoning, so the density bonuses end up only restoring part of what should have been originally allowed.



There has been difficulty in IZ programs finding qualified buyers for it and evidence of homebuyer resistance to lengthy resale price controls. There have been challenges with property maintenance issues as well as the ability of the IZ unit families to afford HOA or condo fees.

IZ tends to work best in urbanized markets where pressure on both land and housing prices are more intense. Also, like impact fees, IZ is reliant on the pace of construction. Consequently, as the recession showed, when construction falls off, few affordable units are built. IZ is also inflexible and adaptable as the market changes and can lock people into what becomes a bad deal. IZ requires ongoing administration by municipal staff who understand development economics and market conditions.

Other nationally recognized researchers have released empirical reviews of inclusionary zoning. This primer discusses the findings of this research; highlights “best practices” of implementing an inclusionary zoning program; and goes on to detail communities where inclusionary zoning has been discontinued because it was too complex and did not achieve the hoped-for results. This research and more can be found in the Latest Reports section.

### **Promising State and Local Alternatives for Providing Affordable Housing**

This primer concludes with a summary of alternative state and local affordable housing solutions including extensive research conducted for NAHB by Abt Associates and Deborah Myerson, which showcase a comprehensive array of approaches to addressing housing affordability through innovative non-federal techniques and programs. A comprehensive list of housing affordability tools are available in NAHB’s [Creating Housing for All](#) report and [Land Use 101](#) webpages.

A 2019 NAHB report, “[Diversifying Housing Options with Smaller Lots and Smaller Homes](#),” produced by Opticos Design, Inc., explores how a greater mix of housing types to increase discreet density can promote greater affordability. The report details the issues involved in building from ADUs to Missing Middle Housing, as well as provides information about the regulatory and design options, and barriers that currently limit or prevent these housing types. Built examples and codes are then given to understand how the success of real life housing diversity and affordability.

“[How Did They Do It? Discovering New Opportunities for Affordable Housing](#)” by Deborah Myerson, conducted in 2016, features detailed case studies from across the country that showcase the many ways in which communities can increase housing affordability. This research reveals that multiple strategies, typically used in a variety of combinations, are needed to close the financing gap and make projects viable.

A 2008 Abt report, “[Research on State and Local Means of Increasing Affordable Housing](#)”, provides extensive but user friendly research with tools organized by land use strategies, financial ones, and “other initiatives”, such as state-level affordability mandates or appeals processes. It explains how the various strategies work, how they have been funded, where they

are used, and key pros and cons of each. It features thirty case studies of communities that have successfully used these tools, often in combination.

Abt Associates completed another report for NAHB in 2015 called "[Development Process Efficiency: Cutting Through the Red Tape](#)", which is a useful addition to this prior research. NAHB staff is available to work with local HBAs as well as jurisdictions looking to address their housing affordability issues, with balanced information on inclusionary zoning as well as resources on comprehensive and appropriate strategies for achieving housing affordability in ever changing economic times.

Given the mixed results on IZ, often popular strategies are not necessarily the most effective. Approaches such as planning and zoning changes to assess development capacity and encourage affordability, expedited permitting processes, and advocacy to reduce NIMBYism can have broad, beneficial effects on housing affordability. Housing trusts combined with land trusts acting as an intermediary between the private and public sectors appear to hold promise as an equitable and successful combination strategy as well.

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# Research on Inclusionary Zoning

Earlier studies on inclusionary zoning have failed to be persuasive. One reason for the failure is that these studies have not used formal statistical methods to control for changing housing market conditions, leaving skeptics room to argue that they were not truly isolating the effect of IZ. Therefore, NAHB funded research on the impacts of inclusionary zoning in two key areas: economic effects and legal and regulatory aspects.

## Price and Production Effects

Economic effects research, presented in "[Housing Market Impacts of Inclusionary Zoning](#)", was conducted in 2008 by Gerrit Knaap, Antonio Bento, and Scott Lowe at the University of Maryland (UMD) Center for Smart Growth. The report compiled considerable data on many jurisdictions in California between 1988 and 2005.

**“Just like other taxes, the burdens of inclusionary zoning are passed on to housing consumers, housing producers, and landowners.”** - National Center for Smart Growth Research and Education

Having data for multiple jurisdictions over an extended period allowed UMD to investigate the impact of IZ on housing production and prices, controlling for differences in market conditions even if the conditions were not directly observed or measured. The final models showing the impact of IZ on total housing starts and the single-family/multifamily breakdown of starts controlled for:

- Recent changes in housing starts in each California jurisdiction;
- Any factor that was different about a particular jurisdiction (e.g., incomes of residents or attitudes toward growth) whether observed in the data or not; and
- Any factor that was different in a particular year (e.g., state of the overall economy or demand for housing) whether observed in the data or not.

The final models showing the impact of inclusionary zoning on the price and size of new single-family homes controlled for:

- Basic characteristics of the house such as number of bedrooms and bathrooms;
- Lot size; any factor that was different about a particular block group (containing on average about 500 homes) whether observed in the data or not;

- Any factor that was different about a particular school district, whether observed in the data or not;
- Any factor that was different in a particular year whether observed in the data or not;
- Any factor that was different in a particular quarter, to control for possible seasonal effects. The effect of these controls is to reduce the estimated impacts of inclusionary zoning, but the impacts that remain after the controls are imposed are difficult to dispute.

The study concluded that, in California between 1988 and 2005, there was a failure to increase the total supply of new housing. The results showed measurable effects of inclusionary zoning on a variety of market factors, including:

- Increasing a city's multifamily housing starts by 7 percent, essentially shifting production to multifamily from single family product;
- This effect increased to as much as 12 percent as inclusionary zoning requirements also increased;
- Raising the price of new homes by 2 – 3 percent, and by as much as 5 percent for more expensive homes, compared to communities without inclusionary zoning;
- Reducing the size of new homes by 48 square feet (Knaap, Bento, & Lowe, 2008).

These results all are statistically significant and are consistent with economic theory suggesting that IZ programs act like a tax on housing construction. Just as with other taxes, the cost burdens of inclusionary zoning are passed on to housing consumers, producers and landowners. Given that more of the units built are multifamily, and that the new homes sold are both smaller and costlier, the impacts show that inclusionary zoning means consumers of new housing pay more for less.

Some may argue that the price increases and size reductions seem relatively small, but to policymakers in areas where affordability is already a concern, any policy exacerbating a problem it is intended to solve would seem undesirable and ineffective. There are easier means of getting smaller multifamily units built, if that should be a community's express goal, than by using this complex market intervention.

A policy brief released in the Journal of the American Planning Association indicates that there is correlation between programs that offer greater density bonuses and exempt smaller developments and producing greater number of units (Schuetz, Meltzer, & Been, 31 Flavors of Inclusionary Zoning: Comparing policies from San Francisco, Washington, D.C. and Suburban Boston, 2009).



Similar effects are still reflected a decade later. Emily Hamilton, a research fellow with the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, has [concluded](#) in a 2019 study in **“Inclusionary Zoning and Housing Market Outcomes”**, which assesses 22 jurisdictions in the Baltimore-Washington region with inclusionary zoning programs, that each year a mandatory inclusionary zoning program is in place, a jurisdiction’s house prices increase by about 1% beyond what they otherwise would. She finds, as the Knaap, Bento, Lowe study, that IZ acts like a tax on new housing. In addition, the IZ programs in this region have produced few units compared with the need; Montgomery County’s program has been in place for many years, but fewer than 4 percent of homes are the result of IZ, and the program in Baltimore that was adopted 9 years ago has only 34 homes for low-income families so far. She concludes that these jurisdictions are using a housing affordability strategy that makes the problem worse for everyone except the few who are lucky enough to qualify for these limited IZ units.

The 2009 study [“Silver Bullet or Trojan Horse: The Effects of Inclusionary Zoning on Local Housing Markets”](#), by Schuetz et al., which controlled for 27 variables in the San Francisco Bay region and 24 variables in the Boston area, indicated that in both cities there is evidence that inclusionary zoning constrains new development, particularly during periods of regional price appreciation. There is also strong evidence that implantation of region-wide inclusionary zoning put upward pressure on single-family home prices in Boston-area suburbs between 1987 and 2008.

In the San Francisco Bay region older inclusionary zoning programs are associated with a decline in local home prices during times of regional price depreciation. While making markets more expensive during times of rapid price appreciation, there is also evidence that IZ policies can make home prices decline faster in periods of depreciation, as both regions have experienced.

The study also indicated that the region-wide programs had failed to produce a substantial number of affordable housing units compared to other programs. For instance, during the control period of 24 years (1979-2003), only 9,154 units of affordable housing through inclusionary zoning were produced in the San Francisco Bay area, while 29,636 units of affordable housing units were produced through the federal Low-Income Housing Tax Credit program.

The San Francisco Bay and Metropolitan Boston regions are largely fragmented regions politically where numerous jurisdictions have adopted IZ policies and have some of the least affordable area-wide housing. In the 2009 study, **“Diffusion of Inclusionary Zoning Across San Francisco Bay Area Governments”**, an empirical conclusion was made that the decision to adopt inclusionary zoning does not reflect a response to an identifiable need for more affordable housing. Rather, it reflects a variety of political characteristics, including the political bent of residents, a stronger regulatory culture and places with more affordable housing non-profits.

# Statutory, Implementation, and Effectiveness Issues

Research on the variety and effectiveness of different IZ programs across the country comes from the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy's report from 2014 titled "[Achieving Lasting Affordability through Inclusionary Housing](#)", by Robert Hickey, Lisa Sturtevant, and Emily Thaden. The paper pulled data from 307 programs across the country and focused on case studies for 20 of those programs.

The case studies revealed that achieving lasting affordability requires more than setting long affordability periods, which has been a hallmark restriction in IZ programs:

**"Strong legal mechanisms, carefully designed resale restrictions, pre-purchase and post-purchase stewardship practices, and strategic partnerships are important for ensuring that inclusionary properties continue to be sold or rented at affordable prices, and are not lost due to illegal sales, foreclosure, or lax rental management practices. Despite the acknowledged importance of stewardship, most jurisdictions report having insufficient resources for comprehensive stewardship and many have not adequately planned for long-term monitoring and stewardship of inclusionary housing units."**

The Lincoln Land report found that while IZ can create large numbers of affordable units in some communities, overall, they have had a relatively small impact on the supply of affordable housing nationwide. While differences in retention levels can be partially explained by program stewardship, differences in the production levels can be partially explained by local housing market conditions. Strong demand for market-rate housing has produced more affordable units compared to weaker housing markets.

The results of the case study analysis suggested the following conclusions about successful and innovative strategies to help ensure lasting affordability:

- Inclusionary housing programs can only be successful in meeting affordable housing needs if they are both producing and preserving units.
- Without the upfront commitment to long-term affordability, inclusionary housing programs will not be able to meet ongoing affordability challenges.
- Long affordability periods that reset offer a compelling alternative to "perpetual" affordability periods and go a long way towards achieving lasting affordability.
- Supplemental legal tools beyond deed restrictions will be needed to improve notification of defaults, potential illegal resales and burdens encumbered by homebuyers through second mortgages and refinancing. Inclusionary housing programs should also have in place legal mechanisms that strengthen the program's

ability to cure or purchase homes in foreclosure. The preemptive right of purchase can help strengthen a program's control of the resale process and proactively keep inclusionary units in the affordable inventory. It can also be a helpful tool for increasing the affordability periods of units built under previous, shorter-term requirements.

- Local jurisdictions need to be responsive to local housing market conditions and household demographics when designing resale formulas and should evaluate the efficacy of their design over time to ensure affordability is being preserved.
- Inclusionary housing programs must actively monitor and steward inclusionary units, either in-house or through external partnerships. The programs highlighted in the case study analysis often made good decisions about setting up affordability periods and legal mechanisms with the goal of promoting lasting affordability. However, critical activities around monitoring and stewardship are often inadequately implemented. Successful programs should look to develop partnerships with organizations that have strong stewardship practices—including Community Land Trusts—to ensure that the affordable housing created through a well-designed inclusionary housing program remains affordable to future owners and renters.
- Tapping local housing trust funds, which can be supported through in-lieu fees, is a practical way to support repair and crucial ongoing maintenance of inclusionary housing units.

Throughout its history of implementation, inclusionary zoning has generally received “good press.” Programs such as the one in Montgomery County, Maryland, have been touted, particularly in planning and community development circles, as an affordable housing panacea that can be replicated in any community inclined to create affordable housing. Many jurisdictions in the United States, however, likely lack the financial resources, staff capacity or expertise needed to implement such complex programs. In addition to the administrative burden added to a community, the tendrils of an inclusionary zoning program reach out and affect a huge array of parties, including the construction industry, lenders, legal industry, affordable housing providers, non-profits, sales and marketing, and the homebuyer. Large and wealthy jurisdictions such as Montgomery County may have the resources to continually run these cumbersome programs, but many local jurisdictions are not Montgomery Counties.

If a community is considering inclusionary zoning despite these concerns, it must do so with great care and not consider it a silver bullet or panacea.

Research conducted for NAHB by attorney Tim Hollister of Shipman and Goodwin LLP in Hartford, CT, provides a national perspective on inclusionary zoning ordinances based on a review of state statutes and ordinances across the country: [“National Survey of Statutory Authority and Practical Considerations for the Implementation of Inclusionary Zoning”](#), June 2007.

Not surprisingly, states vary in how they authorize the use of inclusionary zoning at the local level, ranging from implicit to express enabling authority. Seven states have no express authority; two states prohibit mandatory inclusionary zoning (Oregon and Texas); in two states inclusionary zoning ordinances have been invalidated as conflicting with statewide rent control laws; and 26 states have no express or implied authorization in their enabling statutes, so the authority is dependent on home rule powers.

The National Survey includes an extensive list of 45 components that communities should consider before adopting and implementing an inclusionary zoning ordinance. These elements fall within these broad categories:

- General practical issues;
- Defining applicability;
- Resident eligibility;
- Financial information and management

#### Sections 1-7 Practical Consideration and Challenges

- Factual Justification
- Voluntary vs. Mandatory
- Link to General or Housing Plan
- Construction Incentives
- Financial Incentives
- In-lieu of Fees
- Waivers and Exemptions

#### Sections 8-11 Defining applicability

- Geographic Applicability
- Minimum Applicability Requirements
- Type of Developments Included and Excluded
- Type of Construction Covered

#### Sections 12 – 23 Resident eligibility and selection

- Purchaser and Tenant Eligibility: Local Resident Preference
- Purchaser/Tenant Eligibility: Families vs. Age Restricted
- Required Set Aside Percentages
- Duration of Set Aside Requirements
- Selection of Purchasers/Tenants
- Lotteries
- Marketing and Outreach Requirements
- Renewal and Re-verifications

- Definition of Household Incomes
- Family Size Adjustments
- Down Payment Assumptions
- Minimum Occupancy Requirements\_

#### Sections 24 and 25 Construction Issues

- Sequencing of Construction Set Asides versus Market Rate Units
- Administration of Limitations

#### Section 26 – 40 Financial information and management

- Comparability of market versus affordable units
- Compliance Reporting
- Confidentiality of Income Data
- Sale/resale process and documentation
- Lender documentation
- Required versus Optional Fees
- Utility Allowances
- Government Enforcement
- Real Property taxation
- Use of Percentage of Income in Price Formulas
- Consumer Price Index/ Escalation Formulas
- Capital Improvements to Restricted Price Units
- Principal Residence
- Subletting
- Disposition of Restrictions at the End of Set Aside Period

#### Section 41-45 Procedural and Substantive Legal Challenges

- Procedural Compliances
- Authority to Enact
- Preemption
- Rent Control
- Illegal Exaction/Regulatory Taking

The number of considerations shows that inclusionary zoning is a complex market intervention that should not be taken lightly or copied from another community. It must be considered carefully before adoption.

Another analysis of the complexities and challenges involved in implementing an inclusionary zoning program, titled "[Delivering on the Promise of Inclusionary Housing: Best Practices in Administration and Monitoring](#)", was conducted by Rick Jacobus of the Burlington (VT)

Associates in Community Development. This analysis includes a thorough review of the history of IZ, as well as case studies from several programs across the country and the challenges these communities have faced in implementation. Most critical about this report is that it addresses how the perils unleashed by the housing crash negatively impact these programs. Jacobus concedes that inclusionary zoning can work in the cases where sufficient compensation is afforded the builder for providing an inclusionary zoning unit, typically in the form of density. Also, some multifamily builder members have routinely secured multifamily building permits only on the basis that they provide some amount of IZ.

Interestingly, Jacobus reveals the “dark side” of these programs that are prevalent, and present tremendous challenges yet are seldom discussed by inclusionary zoning advocates. Such increasing problems as mortgage default bedevil many programs and challenge the notion of a clean turnover of an affordable unit from one owner to another. Also, the burdensome legal costs associated with keeping a home deed restricted can cost an agency anywhere from \$500 to \$20,000, per unit, per sale.

Jacobus continues to highlight what it would take to implement an ordinance to produce affordable housing at a level of any significant impact. A jurisdiction implementing an ordinance would have to focus their administration logistics on **eight primary areas:**

#### 1. Production

Home builders forced to produce affordable housing will try to find ways to reduce costs when constructing a home. One builder in California even offered inclusionary zoning units without kitchen cabinets or appliances. Another way to save money on these units is to cluster them in the least desirable location of a project or to use lower cost materials on the exterior of the project. It is up to the administrator of the program to ensure that the affordable units are comparable in external appearance and that the interior size, quality of finishes and amenities are appropriate.



At the Capitol Quarter development in Washington, DC, by builder/developer EYA, inclusionary zoning units are offered as row houses or condominium units disguised as row houses. In the photo, it is hard to determine which unit is the inclusionary zoning unit. In fact, it is the corner unit with three affordable units disguised as a row house. In the same project, row houses were offered as an inclusionary zoning unit, but with a width of 14 feet, as opposed to a width of 16 feet for the market rate units.



## 2. Pricing

The definition of “affordable” will vary from program to program but will often be based on a formula that considers percentage of median household/family income, household family/income, percentage of income spent on housing costs, household size and median home prices. Depending on income levels of a certain region, the percentage of median income thresholds to qualify for these programs may vary.

For instance, in a jurisdiction with very high median incomes, such as San Francisco County, CA, Montgomery County, MD or Fairfield County, CT, income levels up to 120 percent of median income may still qualify persons to participate in an inclusionary zoning program. Generally, programs expect that an owner or renter of an inclusionary zoning unit will not pay more than 30 to 35 percent of their monthly gross income on associated housing costs, which almost always include mortgage, property taxes and insurance, and increasingly, homeowners association (HOA) fees.

HOA fees have received relatively scant attention. However, they are quickly becoming of paramount importance. Particularly in this extended period where homeowners face multiple challenges of falling home values, lower incomes and rising foreclosure costs, HOA fees for those who pay on time are increasing (Understanding the Neighborhood Stabilization Program, PolicyLink 2008). Oftentimes these increases can be quite high. The reason is that HOAs are under increasing pressure due to defaults and non-payment and therefore raise the dues on those that are paying to cover the shortfall. There is some anecdotal evidence that in some situations, taxes and HOA fees combined are now more than mortgages (2010 Semi- Annual Foreclosures in Minnesota, August 9, 2010).

These escalating fees due to the financial crises are becoming a greater concern to low and moderate-income homeowners who may not have the resources or the pay increases to adjust to increasing HOA fees. Whether or not jurisdictions and non-profits are going to be able to access additional funds to help residents offset these increases or to pay fees in arrears has yet to be seen. However, it appears to be increasingly difficult in these times where funds are scarce within all sectors.

## 3. Marketing

Some communities rely on marketplace mechanisms to market IZ programs. Fairfax County, VA relies on Property owners and rental offices to staff the marketing of their portfolio of rental units. The County maintains standards and offers voluntary training to leasing staff who market the units along with market-rate units.

Generally, a jurisdiction marketing their for-sale inclusionary zoning units must engage in a myriad of activities, including performing general outreach to buyers on an ongoing basis; managing a waiting list or interest list of eligible applicants who understand the tradeoffs involved in affordable homeownership; marketing the new development projects both to the

existing waiting list and the general public; marketing individual units at the time of resale; and educating the real estate community about the nature of the program and the available units.

#### 4. Homebuyer Education

Homebuyer education is a common requirement for participants in any affordable housing program. Participants in inclusionary zoning housing programs can be included in general homebuyer education programs that may be run by the jurisdiction or local housing non-profits contracted to the jurisdiction. Programs typically focus on such issues as basic household finance, the home-buying process, credit repair, understanding mortgages, and basic home maintenance and repair.

#### 5. Selection and Screening

Selection is a labor-intensive process that requires all applicants be screened for factors like income, age, household size and credit history, as well as level of non-household debt, the ability to qualify for a mortgage, and first-time homebuyer status. Some programs add to the complexity by imposing different income limits and household size criteria to different units.

In addition, the selection process can be time-consuming, particularly when programs have high demand. In a situation where waiting lists occur, some communities rely on a lottery system. Others use a first-come first-serve system based on those who are qualified, and yet other systems give priority to municipal employees such as fire, police or schoolteachers. Because Fair Housing laws prohibit certain types of restrictions to housing, all programs should be scrutinized by municipal legal staff to ensure that Fair Housing laws are being followed (California Affordable Housing Law Project and Western Center on Law and Poverty, 2002).

#### 6. Financing and Refinancing

Given the problems with the mortgage industry, it is commonly understood that the lending industry has severely tightened their underwriting standards. Although there is no empirical evidence that this has reduced the number of inclusionary zoning units the banks are willing to underwrite, what is often forgotten is that these units generally are underwritten by conventional lenders. Therefore, one can assume that banks may now have more reservations about underwriting units to be sold to low and moderate-income buyers who may have fewer resources in place than higher income buyers.

These lenders must take on the additional complexities with an inclusionary zoning unit and understand the additional restrictions on the deed to preserve the unit as affordable. Staff must work with the local and national mortgage lending community to ensure that there is an adequate pool of mortgages available to service the number of units anticipated to be produced.

## 7. Resale Management

Jacobus points out in his report that one of the most time consuming tasks in running an inclusionary zoning program is re-sale management. Resale management consists of several complex tasks and functions, including responding to homeowner's questions, and maintaining regular communication with all homeowners, brokers, and title companies in the program. Staff must also coordinate and review home inspections for every sale and re-sale, and work with outgoing homeowners to determine any credits for improvements or deductions for damage and deferred maintenance.

## 8. Enforcement and Monitoring

To underscore the problem with enforcing these equity-restricted units, Jacobus points out that in Santa Barbara County, several commissioners called for the end of the 25-year-old inclusionary zoning program after an unscheduled audit found that as many as a quarter of the 400 units were being used illegally for rental income; 9 homes had been lost to foreclosure, and several owners were able to take out second mortgages on the properties far in excess of what the deed restricted value was (Jacobus, 2007).

Although the Commission ultimately decided to keep the inclusionary zoning program and addressed some of the problems with a restructuring, only one staff person remains in position to carry out all the required functions to maintain the County's portfolio of inclusionary zoning housing.

Jacobus points out that, while most owners of an inclusionary zoning unit will comply with the requirements of the program, inevitably some will take advantage of the program and break the rules. A 2004 survey by the City of Palo Alto found that nearly 30 percent of their 179 units of inclusionary zoning had compliance problems of one sort or another (Jacobus, 2007). Perhaps the greatest temptation is to rent out the units at market rate, while still paying a below-market rate mortgage payment. If gone undetected, owners can reap high monthly profits, especially in regions with high monthly rental rates. Therefore, there is additional pressure on staff to enforce the requirements to prevent this sort of abuse of the system. Affordable housing programs that do not have these kinds of deed restrictions are therefore easier to manage in the long run.

Mortgage defaults are forcing staff to divert their valuable time away from managing existing units to act to either avoid foreclosure of the property by the lender or to take extra steps to ensure that the unit remains affordable after the lender has taken back the unit.

Further complicating the administrative processes is specific guidance from the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) found in [ML 94-2 Secondary Financing Provided by Nonprofit Agencies and Transferability Restrictions Permitted for Property with a HUD Insured Mortgage](#), which restricts the ability of potential buyers for IZ units to get a HUD-insured mortgage.

The rule states the long-standing HUD policy that a property with a HUD-insured mortgage shall be free of restrictions that prevent the borrower from freely transferring the property. The rule also prohibits a lender from approving restrictions after the loan is closed. The rule uses the term "legal restrictions on conveyance" to describe such restrictions and this term is broadly defined to include provisions in any kind of legal instrument that would cause a conveyance (including a lease) by the borrower to:

- Be void, or voidable by a third party.
- Be the basis of contractual liability of the borrower. Terminate, or subject to termination, the borrower's interest in the property.
- Be subject to the consent of a third party.
- Be subject to limits on the amount of sales proceeds a borrower can retain.
- Be grounds for accelerating the insured mortgage.
- Be grounds for increasing the interest rate of the insured mortgage.

If a conveyance could cause any of these things to occur, the property is subject to legal restrictions on conveyance (referred to as "restrictions" for the remainder of this Mortgage Letter) and is usually ineligible for HUD mortgage insurance.

This restriction proved to be an issue in Washington D.C. where builders were unable to sell units to buyers using FHA loans. Potential buyers of these units, due to their incomes, are more likely to use FHA loans. The IZ units in DC remained on the market for over 18 months and one developer sued the District after not being able to sell those units. The city has since amended the covenants clause to remove the resale restrictions on these units (Scruggs S., 2013).

# Latest Reports

## **[“Getting Inclusionary Zoning Right”](#), Cushman & Wakefield, May 2019**

The City of Chicago implemented an inclusionary zoning strategy with their Affordable Requirements Ordinance (ARO) beginning in 2003. The ordinance has gone through a multitude of changes; four additional ARO Pilots have increased set-aside requirements leading to consequential effects on development. This report sought to examine these effects, as well as answer the question whether there might be a better path forward to expanding housing options to meet the needs of Chicago’s workforce.

Policymakers have often increased set-aside requirements with the goal of expanding affordable housing production, however this strategy has resulted in more infeasible units. Two ARO Pilot programs requiring 15 – 20 percent set-asides in 2017 and 2018 have yet to produce any onsite units. The report estimates that over 2,600 units have been passed over due to development infeasibility resulting in \$515 million in lost tax revenue. This effect could be mitigated if production of affordable units is scaled along with market-rate developments spread over a larger number of new projects than what currently occurs. Further, the ARO program can be associated with sizable reductions in multifamily development indicators such as land purchases and construction permits.

Other strategies for improving the effectiveness of the ARO program include the expansion of developable land and strategic upzoning. If the city were to expedite the sale and conversion of City-owned land towards housing, for example, development capacity could be increased to have the ARO meaningfully contribute towards Chicago’s housing gap. Cities employing similar strategies can benefit from providing abatements, waivers, and fee reduction to improve the feasibility of affordable housing development.

In 2017, ARO requirements on both onsite and off-site units increased to 20 percent. Naturally, relaxing some restrictions would expand and expedite the affordable housing development process. One example provided is to simplify distance requirements for off-site units to the same ward. Cities such as Chicago should ultimately include all the beneficial strategies described in this report in a comprehensive plan; citywide reevaluation of zoning codes and the permitting process; and promoting a diverse housing strategy. Including the use of ADUs, for example, would continue the City’s economic growth and optimize how market-rate development can solve complex housing issues.

## **[“Revising San Diego’s Inclusionary Zoning Policies: Costs vs. Benefits”](#), the Fermanian Business & Economic Institute, April 2019**

An April 2019 study conducted by the Fermanian Business & Economic Institute, in collaboration with the Building Association of San Diego, looked at the potential costs and benefits of revising the IZ policies in San Diego, California. Housing, specifically in the amount of affordable housing available and the ability of the general population to afford to rent or buy a

home, is a growing issue in the city. After a 2018 approval to boost housing production and raise affordability, the San Diego City Council is now considering altering their existing inclusionary zoning policies.

The changes proposed are as follows: raising the percentage of units in all rental and for-sale projects that are set aside as affordable units under IZ from 10 percent to 15 percent; requiring that all affordable units be built onsite; eliminating the option for builders to pay a fee-in-lieu of building affordable units; and possibly requiring builders to pay the Prevailing Wage on all projects.

The study was able to conclude key impacts from the proposed policy adoptions. Raising the IZ requirements to 15 percent would raise rents on new apartments by an average of \$255 per month and increase new home prices by 7 percent. This increase would also reduce the total production of rental and for-sale new housing by 13 percent; although creating an additional 162 affordable units, there would be a decrease of 875 market-rate units. Costs imposed by higher set-asides for affordable housing cause investors to divert funding to other purposes other than housing; landowners may choose to direct land to other uses or hold it off market entirely as well.

Adding a Prevailing Wage requirement would raise rents a total of \$735 per month and would increase new home prices a total of 19 percent. Adding this requirement would reduce production of housing by 32 percent; only 10 additional affordable units would be produced, with a loss of over 1,700 market-rate units.

Other cities on the west coast, including San Jose and Portland, Oregon have experience large consequential impacts on housing production with restrictive IZ policies. All this evidence further points towards the conclusion that IZ requirements raise the cost of producing new housing, which reduces the amount of housing being produced overall and raises rents and housing prices for market-rate developments.

**[“The Cautionary Tale of Portland’s Inclusionary Housing Policy”](#), Noel Johnson and Mike Kingsella from the Up For Growth National Coalition, April 2019**

Beginning in early 2017, Portland, Oregon mandated that all multifamily housing projects with over 20 units would be required to reserve at least 20% of total units for households earning up to 80 percent of the area median income (AMI) as a part of their inclusionary zoning strategy. The City has recently advertised some seemingly significant numbers— 3,913 units--built under their IZ policy, but this number is misleading without the correct context. In 2018, the first full year that IZ was in effect, Portland issued only 1,709 permits for multifamily units, which reflected a 64 percent decrease in annual housing production relative to the average annual production from 2012 - 2017.

In contrast, the total number of smaller projects, those under 20 units and not subject to the City’s IZ policy, are on the rise leading to a further constricted supply of housing in a growing



market. The policy appears to be leading to a stagnation in housing supply overall rather than increasing the supply of affordable units.

This article notes that Portland's IZ policy is acting like an additional income tax on residents, because the policy leads to increasing rents as supply does not match demand. Middle-income families, those who occupy the 80 percent of the unsubsidized units, are perhaps subject to suffer most from increases in housing costs.

**"Producing Affordable Housing in Rising Markets: What Works?", Lance Freeman and Jenny Schuetz, 2017**

"The most widely used policies, local IZ and statewide "fair share" laws, have produced relatively small numbers of affordable units and are therefore unlikely to substantially mitigate the effects of rising housing costs." "Expressed as a share of the existing housing stock, affordable housing produced under IZ is less than 0.1 percent of existing housing in all regions (Freeman & Schuetz, Producing Affordable Housing in Rising Markets: What Works? 2017)."

The study concluded that increased demand in central cities by high-income households, together with limited land availability and complex development regulations, contribute to higher market-rate housing costs, meanwhile, subsidies for affordable housing and other social safety net programs have declined. The IZ programs aimed to combat these issues have produced a small number of units and are unlikely to meet the demand for below market-rate housing. They call for housing advocates to develop a better understanding of why existing state and local programs have produced only modest amounts of affordable housing, whether these programs could be redesigned to be more productive, and the political dynamics of enacting such programs.

**"Getting Inclusionary Zoning Right", Claude Gruen, August 2016**

Policy can be an effective tool for affordable housing, but development can become discouraged or infeasible when cities set affordable housing requirements for the number of below market-rate units too high, and the prices for rent or sale too low. Uncovering the correct formula that uses policy to mandate affordable housing in a way that works for those on the production side can be difficult. Claude Gruen suggests that rather than using such a tool as IZ, laws that mitigate or prevent the displacement of long-term residents should be the priority.

Cities such as San Francisco and New York, which are often associated with an affordable housing crisis, suffer from restrictive regulations that constrain housing supply to a total of \$1.95 trillion according to an econometric model built by professors Chang-Tai Hsieh of the University of Chicago and Enrico Moretti of the University of California, Berkeley. The author points to political pressure, particularly from NIMBYism, that led elected officials to turn to IZ as a cure-all for affordability crises.

Justifications for IZ have often been coupled with a vilification of gentrification. Gentrification is often a negatively associated word with housing and development yet has been a natural process for decades in the United States. Thus, what is to be avoided is not new construction, but rather the displacement of existing residents. Such a cause can be achieved with policies that give existing residents priority occupancy built under IZ, for example.

Under inclusionary zoning, a beneficial strategy to address the problem described in the first paragraph can be modeled after a system in California that categorizes families based on area median income, and then calculates rent or price based on 30 percent of the median income. Then, and perhaps most importantly, the timing and amount of all costs associated with entitlements, design, financing, and construction would be included to test project feasibility. Along with beneficial zoning regulations, these strategies can positively enhance cities that look to IZ as a strategy for affordable housing.

**[“Making Inclusionary Housing More Flexible: Four Ideas for Urban Settings”](#), Robert Hickey, July 2015**

In 2015, Robert Hickey at the Center for Housing Policy outlined best practices for working with developers in urban areas. Hickey recognizes the need for balance between addressing affordable housing needs and making the requirements feasible for developers. He says that post-recession IZ policies are most necessary in cities where rents are rising faster than incomes, impacting the middle class in addition to low income households. Middle class residents have high rent burdens but do not qualify for federal housing assistance.

Hickey says that flexible IZ policies help improve feasibility by offering developers various ways to meet affordability obligations. This is especially important in urban areas where building materials and methods are more expensive and land costs are high. All these factors, as well as high HOA fees and NIMBY mentalities, sometimes make it hard to meet affordability requirements in same building as the market rate units. Historically, one of the most popular options in these situations was to build off-site units or pay a fee-in-lieu. The issue municipalities’ face when offering these options is they do not further the goal of creating mixed income communities.

How do you lower costs for developers in these high-cost cities while still promoting mixed income neighborhoods? Hickey offers four suggestions:

1. **Permit off-site development in multiple low-income neighborhoods.** If this option is chosen, the municipality could require a greater number of affordable units and mix of bedroom sizes that may not have been available if the units were built on-site. Many municipalities require these units to be built nearby, but the scarcity of affordable land in urban areas makes that a problem. Hickey suggests that municipalities broaden the geographic realm of off-site locations to any low-poverty neighborhood with access to core amenities such as transit service, jobs, and above average schools.

2. **Offer options to preserve or increase the affordability of existing housing.** This is a new alternative to providing on-site units and it gives developers the option to preserve existing housing that is at risk of being lost due to rent spikes. This is done by converting existing market rate housing to deed restricted housing and requires the developer to make minimum level investment in rehabilitation and energy efficiency upgrades. Some programs also allow developers the opportunity to provide direct financial assistance to low income homeowners for home renovations. This is a good option for developers that own existing market rate units in low cost buildings or are building projects with high HOA fees. It should be noted that the cities that currently offer this option haven't had much interest from developers, but it may become more popular as land prices increase.
3. **Restrict Fee-Revenue Spending to Broad, Designated Areas.** The option to pay a fee-in-lieu is good for developers, especially developers of small projects. Both San Diego and Seattle are fee first programs where units may be built in-lieu of paying a fee. In San Diego the fees are collected and distributed by community planning area.
4. **Provide flexibility on the incomes served.** Allowing a developer to select from a menu of income targets gives them greater flexibility to make sure the mix is right for the project there are building as well as their bottom line. For example, instead of requiring that 10 percent of the units be made available to 80 percent AMI, a developer could be given leeway to provide a percentage of units to 50 percent AMI and a percentage to 100 percent AMI.

Hickey points out that not all these policies will work in all places, but in general, all cities can benefit from giving developers more pathways to affordability. He also notes that new IZ policies are showing up in locations where IZ has been historically rare, such as Nashville, Atlanta, and Pittsburgh, reminding us that housing affordability is a constant issue that policymakers are being pressured to address by both regulators and stakeholders.

**["Expanded Housing Opportunities Through Inclusionary Zoning: Lessons from Two Counties"](#),  
The Urban Institute, December 2012**

In 2012, The Urban Institute conducted research on IZ with the University of Maryland and published "[Expanded Housing Opportunities Through Inclusionary Zoning: Lessons from Two Counties](#)". Their research examines how effective IZ programs are as a strategy to increase the supply of affordable housing and further other housing- and community-related goals in two study sites: Montgomery County, Maryland, and Fairfax County, Virginia. These programs were selected because they operate in the same metropolitan housing market and have been in place for decades.

Unlike many other programs, which have failed to produce many affordable units, these two programs have successfully increased the supply of affordable housing in their jurisdictions. Here's what the report notes that can be learned from their programs:

1. Ordinance requirements must be clear and administered consistently so that developers are able to make more informed decisions about where to build inclusionary housing units.
2. The revision of program requirements, which both counties execute every few years or so, may be a disincentive for a builder to pursue inclusionary zoning units because of ordinance complexity.
3. Requirements should allow for a reasonable degree of flexibility and offer a range of options or incentives to the developer to produce more affordable housing units.
4. Because land values drive the costs of construction and development, local governments that use or consider using inclusionary zoning to expand housing opportunities for low- and moderate- income families should be cognizant of how these costs can shape development decisions (The Urban Institute, 2012).

Other strategies include reducing the regulatory burdens on development and increasing densities. The authors cite NAHB's Cost of Regulations research which estimates that costs associated with complying with federal, state, and local development regulations amount to 24 percent of new house prices. Upzoning will make it possible to produce smaller, lower-cost housing units, such as Accessory Dwelling Units (ADU) and missing middle housing types, in single-family neighborhoods. These two approaches would also benefit middle income households.

One of the difficulties in employing these strategies is that they require increased public support—both financial and political—for developing high-density housing in affluent communities, which in many communities is hard to come by. The research concludes by echoing the notion that creating affordable housing is not a silver bullet strategy, as it alone is unlikely to enable disadvantaged households to take advantage of new economic opportunities. It cites HUD's Choice Neighborhoods Initiative as an example of an approach that attempts to combine affordable housing with other components of human development necessary for economic mobility (Freeman & Schuetz, *Producing Affordable Housing in Rising Markets: What Works?*, 2017).

# The Role of Incentives in Closing the Affordability Gap in Inclusionary Zoning

NAHB developed a greatly expanded list of incentives based on input from roundtable groups of developers, financiers, builders, planners, and municipal representatives. The resource, **“The Role of Incentives in Closing the Affordability Gap in Inclusionary Zoning”**, includes incentives that can be used with single-family as well as multifamily applications, in a variety of market types, from urban to small communities. Some include important contributions local governments can make to achieve results with IZ, as well.

Based on NAHB’s substantial experience reviewing ordinances from across the country and its work with builders and developers, we know that most Inclusionary Zoning (IZ) ordinances offer some form of incentives, in an effort to avoid unconstitutional exactions claims and also to allow the developer to recoup some of the subsidy he is being required to provide by constructing a certain percentage of lower-priced units within a market-rate development project.

Typical incentives offered include density bonuses, parking reductions, expedited development review processes, and reduced fees. But implementing these incentives is not always achievable in today’s complex and lengthy development approval process, which includes heavy citizen input and opposition to development—especially affordable housing. They also typically don’t cover much of the developer’s subsidy gap. For example, concessions made during the review and approval process make it difficult to obtain the density already theoretically allowed by zoning, so IZ incentive density bonuses only end up restoring part of the density that should have been allowed originally.

The notion that IZ programs need to take development economics into account has been echoed by [Urban Land Institute](#), [EcoNorthwest](#), [Grounded Solutions Network](#), and the [Urban Institute](#), all of whom have developed educational tools with a similar goal in mind: to make IZ work better for all players. Yet as noted, only a few types of incentives are generally discussed in planning policy circles.

Multiple incentives used in combination are needed to close this considerable financing gap and thus make projects feasible. The relative value of any one incentive or combination of incentives to a project can also vary depending upon the product type—e.g., horizontal single-family versus vertical multifamily—and the market. Parking incentives, for example, are generally only relevant and useful to higher density, multifamily rental projects.

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**ZONING/SUBDIVISION  
DIMENSIONAL  
MODIFICATIONS**

- Lot Coverage
- Building Height
- Lot Area
- Open Space/Landscaping
- Frontage

**PARKING  
MODIFICATIONS**

- Reduction in No. of Parking Spaces Required
- Increase in No. of Compact Spaces Allowed

**DENSITY BONUS**

- Bonus Formula (e.g., 1 market-rate unit or lot for each affordable unit or lot)
- Bonus Amount Based on Percentage of Affordable Units/Lots

**CONSTRUCTION/DESIGN**

- Reduction in Interior Amenities
- Different Interior Amenities if Finishes of Durable/Good Quality

**FEE  
REDUCTIONS/WAIVERS**

- Mitigation (Impact) Fees
- Permitting Fees
  - Permit Review
  - Building Inspection
- Utility Connections

**EXPEDITED PERMITTING**

- Limit on No. of Days for Completion of Review and Approval
- Separate Approval Process
- Priority Processing of Project

**INFRASTRUCTURE**

- Tax increment financing of infrastructure
- Extension or updating of utilities to serve site

**PUBLIC COST LIMITING/  
SHARING**

- Payment of In-Lieu Fee for Required IZ Units
- Tax incentives
- Contribution or lease of underutilized or vacant land
- Demolition cost
- Tax abatement
- Environmental liability
- Soft (Forgivable) Second Mortgage
- Funding or implementation of social support programs for project



# Promising State and Local Alternatives for Providing Affordable Housing

Different markets and different income segments require different tools for improving affordability. At the lower end of the income spectrum this may be multiple direct subsidies. For families higher on the income range this may be better planning for housing and removal of some regulatory barriers to allow the market to function more efficiently.

Unfortunately, an increasing number of communities today are adopting and imposing inclusionary zoning in the belief that this approach alone will close this gap. It has become a politically expedient means for communities to show they are addressing the affordability problem instead of taking a more comprehensive approach to understanding and resolving this issue.

Most inclusionary zoning programs impose controls that limit the resale prices of such units for a period of 5 to as long as 20 or even 30 years. The purpose of this is to keep the housing units affordable, but the result is that owners in these units are barred from building equity. To avoid takings challenges and enhance participation in these programs, such programs also typically offer developers density bonuses and other incentives such as waivers/reduced requirements and expedited permitting, yet on-the-ground experience shows that such incentives are increasingly difficult to achieve in the development approval process today.

Inclusionary zoning should only be implemented with sufficient compensation to developers and builders and should only be considered as part of a “broad and comprehensive strategy to address housing affordability at the state and local level that closely examines the causes of that problem and relies on a variety of targeted approaches to address those causes, including direct income and housing subsidies, removal of zoning and regulatory barriers to provide for sufficient number of housing units to meet projected growth, rather than relying primarily on mandatory Inclusionary Zoning.” This is language found in NAHB’s current policy on Inclusionary Zoning.

To focus on a more comprehensive approach to funding affordable housing, NAHB hired Abt Associates to research other non- federal approaches to housing affordability. Abt prepared a 350-page compilation of state and local affordability strategies entitled “[Research on State and Local Means of Increasing Affordable Housing](#)” (2008) that also includes how these programs are funded, where they’ve been used, and the advantages and disadvantages of each. Many communities have enjoyed significant success with innovative programs designed to address the housing affordability challenge, and many of the most innovative and successful approaches are detailed in this extensive but user friendly report.

The report includes 30 detailed case studies that explain how local governments used these strategies to address their housing affordability needs. These case studies represent the most comprehensive report ever compiled about non-federal solutions. Most of them highlight new

examples not previously described in other reports by such organizations as HUD, the Center for Housing Policy, and the Urban Land Institute.

The Abt Associates report focuses on three types of strategies:

- Land use strategies, such as planning, zoning, and novel development strategies;
- Financial strategies, including property taxes, other taxes, state tax credits, impact fee waivers, regional financing approaches, and other sources of financing;
- Other initiatives, such as informational strategies, organizational strategies, reforms to zoning and development codes, and state legislation.

The Abt Associates study also found that the most successful places rely on an array of strategies to encourage affordable housing, and that the strategies that get the most press are not necessarily the most effective.

A good example is a case study of North Kingstown, RI, which used a variety of strategies, including state mandates and guidance for local planning and a significant density bonus and streamlined permitting program for developers.

Emeryville, CA established zoning codes and development regulations to encourage infill and brownfields development, high-density housing and mixed-use development. Among the successes is Emeryville Warehouse Lofts, which includes 140 lofts, 129 other residential units, 7,000 square feet of retail space, a 4,500 square-foot landscaped courtyard and a renovated parking structure.

Since the report was published in 2008, there have been other interesting developments. In 2016, NAHB hired planning consultant Deborah Myerson to research innovative, affordable projects that were built without the use of inclusionary zoning programs. The report, "[How Did They Do It? Discovering New Opportunities for Affordable Housing](#)" reveals that multiple strategies, typically used in a variety of combinations, are needed to close the financing gap and make projects viable. Some of the dominant approaches that have helped communities increase the local affordable housing supply include implementing a strong local housing policy, engaging in effective public-private partnerships, and embracing high design standards.

All these examples show that the creation of affordable housing is a complicated undertaking that requires not only financial support from multiple resources, but also community support, political support, specialized expertise, a project led by perseverance, and a little bit of luck. The projects are listed below, along with the key strategies that made each one a success.

### **Peak One Neighborhood, Frisco, Colorado**

- Donation of town-owned land for affordable housing development
- Local affordable housing policies
- Dedicated funding to support affordable housing
- Successful public engagement and comprehensive master planning
- Deed restrictions for qualified incomes and residency
- Limited equity appreciation for permanent affordability

### **Ferry Crossing, Old Saybrook, Connecticut**

- Incentive Housing Zone program established to guide communities to proactively plan for affordable housing
- Technical assistance from the Housing Connections of Connecticut program, a partnership between Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC) and the Connecticut Housing Coalition
- Project financing from the Connecticut Department of Economic and Community Development, Liberty Bank, and the Federal Home Loan Bank of Boston
- Strong community support to meet housing needs for residents priced out of current supply of market-rate housing
- Nonprofit advocacy organization to spearhead community engagement
- Experienced non-profit housing developer to secure financing and oversee construction
- Municipal land donation and remediation to lower the cost of development

### **Wildflower Terrace at Mueller, Austin, Texas**

- A robust public-private partnership
- Substantial, long-term public engagement
- A strong public policy commitment to affordable housing
- Design guidelines and review process for a cohesive neighborhood fabric

### **Daybreak, South Jordan, Utah**

- Mixed-use development
- Variety of housing types and price points
- Green building
- Sustainable development
- Multimodal transportation options
- Pedestrian-friendly design

### **Old Town Commons, Alexandria, Virginia**

- Strong Housing Market
- Collaborative public-private partnership
- Experienced developer of mixed-income communities
- Leadership from the housing authority
- Supportive city council
- New community center

### **Lofts at Reynoldstown Crossing, Atlanta, Georgia**

- Strategic adaptive reuse that emerged from a failed upscale condominium development
- Housing and transportation linkages for sustainable development
- Rapid turnaround from acquisition to closing
- Pilot for community land trust condominium units
- Drawing for units that generated quick and successful closings
- Land banking of 1.4 adjacent acres for future developments
- Providing accessible and affordable financing to workforce buyers

### **Arcade Apartments, St. Louis, Missouri**

- Historic rehabilitation of a local landmark
- Vibrant mixed-use redevelopment
- Downtown revitalization
- Public-private partnership
- Widespread support and will to transform a derelict but architecturally significant property

### **Oxford Mills, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania**

- Successful partnership of mission-driven private developers
- Workforce housing for an underserved market
- Creative financing of affordable housing with New Market Tax Credits
- Attractive rehabilitation and conversion of a formerly derelict industrial property
- A successful model for development replicable across different markets
- Neighborhood revitalization

### **CityView @ Van Ness, Fresno, California**

- Housing authority engaged in community building
- Collaborative effort between the housing authority and the city

- Affordable housing in a mixed-use property as an economic stimulus for downtown
- Modern, attractive design that challenges conventional notions of affordable housing
- Careful consideration to address the historic significance of the site

#### **Affordable Housing Corporation of Lake County, Libertyville, Illinois**

- Partnership with local government for political and financial support
- A revolving loan fund
- Ability to absorb a higher-than-usual level of risk to renovate the most derelict, vacant units
- Neighborhood stabilization

#### **Rainier Vista, Seattle, Washington**

- Housing authority served as master planner for a comprehensive redevelopment
- City of Seattle's collaborative commitment to coordinate on infrastructure development
- Rainier Vista design book for consistent design standards throughout the project
- Active Citizen Review Committee for stakeholder engagement
- One-to-one replacement policy for public housing units
- Transit-oriented design to prepare for the new light rail line
- Doubled density from the original project to create a mixed-income community
- Infrastructure redesign to integrate with the existing street grid

#### **The Rose, Minneapolis, Minnesota**

- Long-term vision and persistence over a 15-year redevelopment project
- Community engagement in the outcome
- Commitment to innovation and cost management to achieve pioneering green building in affordable housing
- Teamwork between nonprofits with complementary strengths

# Conclusion

Households continue to struggle to find housing that meets their needs at a price they can afford. Many are still forced to commute long distances, pay a disproportionate share of their incomes on housing, or live in housing that simply does not meet their needs.

The reality is that inclusionary zoning may not work at all in some markets and may worsen the shortage of affordable housing in others. In fact, as pointed out through the case studies described in this paper, inclusionary zoning often provides far less affordable housing and in a far more cumbersome way than many of the traditional affordable housing programs such as HOME, CDBG, nonprofits and the low- income housing tax credit have been able to provide for.

An interesting phenomenon related to the recession is the impact it had on inclusionary zoning programs. Inclusionary zoning units that are repossessed by the bank need to be resold to below market rate incomes, but often this can be difficult to ensure in the public auction process. It added yet another layer of complexity and challenge to an already tedious affordable housing program.

The research by [Opticos Design Inc.](#), Abt Associates and Deborah Myerson demonstrates that there are successful alternatives to inclusionary zoning that can have a far greater impact in meeting the housing needs of low- and moderate-income families.



# Appendix

## **STORIES FROM THE FIELD: Communities that have Discontinued or Reshaped Inclusionary Zoning**

Because of its complexities and the effort required to administer it, there are a growing number of communities that have discontinued the use of IZ or reshaped it to incorporate other tools for achieving lasting affordability.

### **Madison, Wisconsin**

Since the program's inception in February 2004, 48 developments were approved in the City of Madison with a total of 2075 homes, of which 173 (8.3 percent of total) were affordable under the inclusionary zoning guidelines, and 33 (19 percent of affordable and 1.6 percent of all homes) have been sold to date (Inclusionary Zoning Advisory Oversight Committee, 2008).

An article written by Terrence Wall of Smart Growth Madison and published in the Madison Isthmus Weekly pointed out that:

“Inclusionary zoning, Madison's well-meaning program to increase the supply of affordable housing, has had a starkly perverse impact on the local housing market: vacancy rates have declined, and rental rates have increased, producing exactly the opposite effect that IZ advocates wanted (Wall, 2007).”

The article includes research that indicates in the period 2001 to 2003, developers built 3,257 housing units in Madison, compared to only 1,954 units from 2004 to 2006, a 40 percent decrease after the IZ ordinance was passed in early 2004.

In 2006, Madison issued only 143 permits for market-rate apartment units, down from 660 in 2003. That 143 number is incredibly low when one considers that the city has on the average issued permits for 807 units annually since 1993, the majority of which were market-rate units.

The dramatic downturn in new construction caused vacancy rates to decline in existing units and net rents to increase, thereby achieving the opposite effect of what the city intended: overall higher costs of housing for everyone. Kent Disch, former Community Affairs Director of the Madison Area Home Builders Association, indicated that the ordinance was constantly under amendment due to the complex nature of the policy.

Even advocates for workforce housing had to concede that the program was not effective when only 15 inclusionary zoning homes were sold in 15 years. Disch stated that “The program just didn't make sense, our inclusionary zoning lots sat empty because the market was flooded with existing homes listed below the inclusionary zoning unit price, and prospective home buyers just were not interested in purchasing an equity restricted house with a more complicated

financing and closing process.” Another helpful amendment was that after 270 days without selling, the inclusionary zoning lots could return to the market rate price. Disch added “Many builders simply waited out the required time before aggressively marketing those lots.”

The City suffered additional blows to their faltering program. In 2006 the Wisconsin Supreme Court struck down the entire ordinance as a form of rent control, which is banned by Wisconsin state statute. The City therefore had to revise the ordinance to remove the rental component of the ordinance. Given the low number of units generated by the program in the four years since its inception (only 1.9 percent of all new dwelling units), and the ongoing controversy that the program had created in the community, the City Council decided not to renew the program when its sunset provision came up for renewal in 2009.

### **St. Cloud, Minnesota**

St. Cloud, population 66,000, is the primary city of a half-dozen cities clustered around the Mississippi River in central Minnesota, about 60 miles northwest of Minneapolis. In 2001 there was a concern in the community that more and more residents of central Minnesota were being priced out of quality housing and homeownership opportunities. It was estimated that during 2001, the price of housing rose by about 16 percent in the area, due to increased demand and lack of supply.

The Central Minnesota Task Force on Affordable Housing was created to address the issue. One of the many proposals considered was recommending that the six cities in the region adopt inclusionary zoning ordinances for what was referred to as “Life-Cycle Housing.”

The premise in St. Cloud and other central Minnesota cities is that minimum lot sizes required by area zoning laws are now so large that they are impeding the ability to provide for affordable single-family homes (Bannanian, 2002). If local governments were to provide density bonuses by allowing for smaller lot sizes, in exchange for providing 15 percent below-market rate housing units, the theory goes, it would be a “win-win” for all parties involved.

However, this was not to be the case. As this case study demonstrates, inclusionary zoning is often an ill-suited fit for a community. Like the Madison example, there was just little interest by the home buying public in purchasing equity-restricted new home, when similar homes nearby could be purchased at lower prices with no restrictions. At its April 2007 meeting, the “Life Cycle Housing” Board voted to terminate the inclusionary zoning program, which was adopted in 2004, and replace it with a standing committee on affordable housing under the St. Cloud Area Joint Planning District Board. The five city councils voted to ratify that action, which means that the inclusionary zoning program no longer exists.

In 2006 and into 2007, the Life Cycle Housing Board considered reducing the percentage (15 percent to 5 percent) of inclusionary zoning housing lots because of the high number of vacant lots (several hundred in St. Cloud alone); the fact that funding sources were no longer awarding funds to proposals submitted for inclusionary zoning housing; and because the City of St.

Cloud's housing efforts, through its Housing and Redevelopment Authority (HRA), directed at existing housing in existing or core neighborhoods, which appeared to be effectively addressing the affordable housing problem in the region.

Under the various funding mechanisms for lifecycle housing, including Inclusionary Zoning, there were a total of 28 homes (or 40 depending on the source) built and sold since the program's inception in 2002. During the same time, the St. Cloud HRA acted independently of the inclusionary zoning program and sold more than 83 single family detached homes and townhomes, all without the equity restrictions. (inclusionary zoning units were sold to households with annual incomes of less than 80 percent of the state median income and resold with 50 percent equity restriction in years 1- 10, declining to no equity restriction after year 20).

The existing inclusionary zoning homes went into a 90-year community land lease. The developer/builder holding life-cycle lots will individually negotiate with the respective city.

The unintended consequence of the inclusionary zoning program and the St. Cloud HRA efforts was that first-time home buyers were not purchasing existing homes in existing neighborhoods, fixing them up, and using that equity to purchase their next home. With existing homes not selling, interest rates dropping, and being in a large college community; these homes were purchased by investors for rentals. (St. Cloud is a regional center on the Mississippi River with older neighborhoods and a 15,000 student university located in one of those neighborhoods).

As St. Cloud city leaders and citizens of the area viewed their changing neighborhoods and causes, they became adamant that existing homes be the primary focus of the housing affordability efforts, not new housing attained through an inclusionary zoning program, and that financing assistance be available to potential buyers. This action became the reason for the termination of the inclusionary zoning program as the City of St. Cloud began to concentrate on the existing housing in its core neighborhoods and felt it could not commit resources (funds and personnel) to a program with emphasis on new housing.

In lieu of an inclusionary zoning program, the St. Cloud HRA established the boundaries for the core neighborhoods and then pooled existing funds to launch this program—almost an “urban pioneer” program:

- revised the existing CDBG homeowner rehabilitation program to a zero interest deferred loan of up to \$15,000 for repairs to existing homes, payable at time of sale, refinance, or move-out;
- separate funds were set aside to assist households that had incomes below 70 percent of area median income, or 70 percent to 100 percent, or more than 100 percent;
- provided gap financing of zero interest, no payment deferred loan, payable at time of sale, refinance, or move-out; to households with dependents, and not exceeding 80

percent of state median income; and

- created a homestead incentive program of five year forgivable loan, prorated forgiveness each year. This funding was exhausted in a few months by providing 40 loans totaling \$200,000. This equals 40 new owner-occupied existing homes in core neighborhoods.

The St. Cloud HRA is seeking additional funding because, within a few months, the program was so successful that the HRA was able to rehabilitate 40 existing homes for low- and moderate-income buyers that will be owner-occupied in those core neighborhoods with no equity restrictions.

### **Tallahassee, Florida**

The City of Tallahassee is the state capital of Florida, with a population of around 250,000. The city enacted an inclusionary zoning ordinance in 2005, with a revision to the program in 2008. The basic requirements of the program are a 10 percent set aside for affordable units, with a 25-percent density bonus and a minimum threshold of 50 units to be applicable to the program (City of Tallahassee, Adopted 2005, Amended 2008).

Through 2009, no units of affordable housing had been created through the program (City of Tallahassee, 2009). As stated in the City's Consolidated Plan, the City recognizes that the recent downturn in the state's housing market has hampered the City's ability to generating housing using this method.

The production of new units is still a viable option for the City of Tallahassee; however, the weak new construction market combined with a 12-month surplus of housing available for sale and a high foreclosure rate in the city means that in the next 2 to 3 years the City will likely focus on rehabilitation and reconstruction rather than new construction.

The fact that the City has not built one unit of affordable housing through their inclusionary zoning program underscores how susceptible these programs can be to recessionary cycles, particularly in smaller communities.

In contrast, the city also implements an affordable housing program utilizing formula grants from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's HOME and CDBG programs and the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit. Currently there are approximately 4,037 affordable rental units made available in the city by the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit. CDBG funding and the state's State Housing Initiatives Partnership Act (SHIP) program are also used to provide for 420 down-payment assistance programs as well as 50 deep subsidy loans for homeownership for households 50percent below the median household average. Additionally, the Community Housing Development Organization, a non-profit affordable housing program will use grants to rehabilitate 25 existing homes in the next four years into workforce housing home-buying opportunities (City of Tallahassee, 2009).

In addition to the failure to produce even one unit of affordable housing in six years, the City also had to go through a costly lawsuit. In Florida HBA, Tallahassee BA, Hermitage Ventures and Sue Boynton vs. City of Tallahassee, the plaintiffs filed suit against the City claiming a violation of due process because the ordinance was “arbitrary and capricious,” in terms of who in the public the program would benefit; that it was an unlawful taking because the ordinance targeted only a small group of the citizenry to provide a public good without just compensation; and that it was an unlawful state tax because municipalities in Florida are barred from levying real estate or personal property taxes (Zurier, 2006). Although the Circuit Court ruled in favor of the City in the case, the City had to spend tax dollars and manpower to defend a program that has yet to produce any units.

### **Palm Beach County, Florida**

Similarly, in Palm Beach County, during the height of Florida’s frenzied housing boom, an alarmed County Commission decided to “take action” on housing affordability and, with the reluctant collaboration of the local HBA, enacted an inclusionary zoning ordinance in early 2006. Then the bottom fell out of the market. In 2000, the median house price in Palm Beach County was \$135,200 (United States Census Data, 2009), by the First Quarter of 2006 that price had escalated to \$393,000 (2010 Survey by Florida Associations of Realtors), but by 2009 had plunged to \$244,500 and fallen even further by Third Quarter 2010 to \$226,600 (2010 Florida Realtors Report).

Chris Roog, former Executive Officer of the Gold Coast Builders Association and Government Affairs Director, indicated that since the ordinance passed in 2006, not one inclusionary zoning unit has been constructed in the county of more than 1.3 million people. “The demand simply isn’t there. The industry has been so hard hit that there literally have been no projects approved in the last four years. If projects have received approval, none have broken ground.” With no development projects approved there is no way to create the associated percentage of affordable housing. “Plus, with the huge number of foreclosures in the County, people can purchase a single-family home for as little as \$50,000.”

Based on the formula for inclusionary zoning units set in the ordinance, which are based on average annual income for the county, inclusionary zoning units would have to be marketed at around \$150,000. Roog noted “why would anyone pay more for an “affordable” unit when the market is providing units at lower prices, with none of the equity restrictions attached. If the County were really interested in promoting affordable housing they would be scooping up the huge overhang of foreclosures, we have weighing down housing prices and assisting moderate income buyers with financing and down payment assistance, so they can buy these homes.”

Doing so would not only provide affordable housing but also prop up home values and boost the construction industry by taking foreclosed properties off market. “The County would rather just keep the phantom IZ ordinance on the books because they don’t know what else to do...”

Fortunately for Roog and the south Florida home builders, the County reviews the ordinance once a year. If the program continues to produce no units, there may be a chance for eventual repeal of the in the future.

## **McCall, Idaho**

In 2008, the Fourth Judicial Court of Idaho struck down an ordinance enacted by the city of McCall mandating private builders and developers to build and deed-restrict properties for "workforce housing." In 2007 the local REALTORS association had filed a lawsuit against the city of McCall seeking a declaratory ruling that McCall's ordinance was an unconstitutional taking of private property rights, an illegal taxing scheme, and that the city exceeded its jurisdiction and authority in passing the ordinances. The court's overturning of the ordinance highlights the perils faced by local jurisdictions considering adoption of an inclusionary zoning ordinance.

Among other things, the ordinances required that developers and builders set aside, build and deed restrict 20 percent of a development for "workforce housing." Under the ordinances, the deed-restricted properties were reserved for people making 100percent to 160percent of the median wage in Valley County in central Idaho. The local government would award priority points to certain types of jobs that would qualify for the housing. Such homes would be permanently price-restricted. The ordinances mandated an equivalent "in lieu of" fee as an option to building such homes.

The 4th Judicial District Court included the following points in the Memorandum Decision:

- "These restrictions go much further than merely regulating the use of property; instead, they essentially regulate ownership of the property by dictating to whom a unit may be sold or rented."
- "This Court concludes such 'regulation' is arbitrary and unreasonable as a land use provision."
- "This Court is convinced that the imposition of the subsidy or fee required under Ordinance Nos. 819 and 820 are, in reality, a tax, and not a regulation."

Idaho Association of Realtors Chief Executive Kevin Price was quoted on the court's decision, stating "The City simply went too far and exceeded its authority. The imposition of this burden on the landowners or developers amounts to an unlawful tax. In addition, the ordinances go much further than the City's authority to regulate the use of property. By dictating to whom a housing unit may be sold or rented, the City has improperly attempted to regulate property ownership. We certainly agree with the Court's determination that this "regulation" is arbitrary and unreasonable. There are developments in Valley County constructed under the ordinances. When the market softened, consumers had a choice between purchasing deed- restricted lots that can't appreciate in price, or unencumbered lots for the same price. Naturally, buyers chose to purchase homes with no free-market restrictions. Some of these "affordable workforce

housing units" have been lying vacant for months. The people who were forced to build them are really taking a bath February 2008 Idaho Association of REALTORS Press Release)."

### **Bozeman, Montana**

In yet another example of how inclusionary zoning is very susceptible to downturns in the housing market, two years after the city of Bozeman's Workforce Housing Ordinance went into effect, no homes were built under the program. While the city points out that all home building has slowed with the economic downturn, many within the building community have called for it to be repealed.

The workforce housing program requires developers of some subdivisions to price a portion of their homes or condominiums under \$200,000 and trains Bozeman residents for homeownership. The Bozeman City Commission adopted the ordinance in July of 2007 in hopes of giving working class families who makes less than \$70,000 a year wider options for owning a home in Bozeman.

In its original approval of the ordinance, the city commission stipulated that its effectiveness be reviewed in two years. They looked at an update on the program compiled by staff but did not discuss it during their meeting. Instead, they voted to review the program again in another year, hopeful that the market will improve and give the program a chance to work (Ricker, Amanda, Bozeman Daily Chronicle, September 1, 2009).

### **Davie, Florida**

South Florida is one of the epicenters of the current housing price crash and foreclosure crisis. The Town of Davie was a fast-growing bedroom community with a population of approximately 90,000 located immediately west of Fort Lauderdale. Since 2000, the population increased by 14,609 people or by approximately 5,555 dwelling units (2000 and 2010 U.S. Census Data). In response to rapidly escalating prices during the housing bubble years, Davie finalized adoption an inclusionary zoning policy in early 2008. To date, not only have no affordable units been created through the program, hardly any residential building units have been constructed at all, relative to the boom years earlier in the decade. In 2007, 274 residential units were constructed in the city; in 2010, that number was reduced to 72 units (Town of Davie, Florida Building Department).

The Town's Vice-Mayor stated that "I have been told that this (ordinance) is prohibiting a lot of people from building in our town (Bryan, 2011)." A local realtor recently informed the Town Council that a developer who wanted to build a 50-unit housing development in the town decided not to after reading the inclusionary zoning ordinance (Bryan, 2011).

In a time of budgetary crisis, stagnant home building and shrinking tax bases, communities desperate for new development do not need burdensome regulations such as inclusionary

zoning hampering their ability to resolve their fiscal problems. The Town Council has subsequently voted to suspend the Ordinance for two years.

### **Longmont, Colorado**

In August 2011, the City of Longmont, Colorado voted to end its inclusionary zoning program after a year-long debate within the community. Longmont is located about 29 miles northwest of Denver and has a population of 86,000.

Although the program managed to produce some units, the City realized that having an inclusionary zoning ordinance was an impediment to bringing jobs and businesses to the community in a challenging economy. The repeal did not just take effect for future housing units, but also lifted all re-sale deed restrictions for housing built under the inclusionary zoning ordinance. This was an added benefit to existing residents in the community, akin to a tax break and would provide for an added shot in the arm for the local community.

In lieu of the repealed ordinance, a stakeholder group was established by the Council to re-examine the state of housing affordability in the community given the falling real estate prices. Denver is the only other jurisdiction in the metropolitan Denver area that has an inclusionary zoning ordinance, and two council members in that city are seeking to revisit the ordinance.

### **Montgomery County, Maryland**

In Montgomery County, only 77 inclusionary zoning units were produced in 2007, an all-time low in the 36-year history of the program; this after 400 units were produced in 2005, at the height of the building boom (Montgomery County, MD Department of Housing and Community Services). This reinforces the notion that inclusionary zoning programs are highly susceptible to market and economic fluctuations and cycles, and when affordable housing production is mandated on the backs of the market-price housing industry.

### **Santa Fe, New Mexico**

Santa Fe's experience with IZ is further evidence that this tool is best suited for the strongest markets during the best times. In 2005, the city started enforcing an IZ ordinance that required at least 30 percent of all new developments be affordable. However, only 27 out of 181 proposed affordable units have been built and sold over the last nine years. Meanwhile, the local housing trust says they have 200 – 300 people waiting to buy an affordable home.

The ordinance was developed during the housing boom without developer input and when the recession began, it made meeting the requirements of the ordinance impossible. The 30 percent number was modeled after similar ordinances in more expensive, higher density areas like San Francisco and Chicago, where incomes are also higher than in Santa Fe.



To reduce the onerous requirements, the city has reduced the required percentage from 30 percent affordable to 20 percent affordable. Santa Fe also reduced the affordability term for rental units from 20 years to 10 years. According to staff, this decision was driven primarily by the city's interest in encouraging more market-rate rental housing in the city. The city has also changed the resale requirements. For example, if a homeowner originally bought a house worth \$175,000 for \$125,000, and its value jumped to \$250,000 by the time of sale, they would owe the city \$75,000 instead of \$50,000. The new ordinance allows homeowners to repay only the dollar amount of subsidy they received when they first bought the house.

### **New York, New York**

In 2014, New York City's Mayor De Blasio unveiled his plan for an overhaul of the city's existing IZ program. Former Mayor Bloomberg's model allowed developers to build 20 percent bigger if they set aside 20 percent of the new apartments at below-market rates. While the program under Mayor Bloomberg remained voluntary, the new program will be mandatory when building in a targeted neighborhood that has been upzoned for higher densities. The new program will require developers in those areas to build projects that are a 20 percent low-income, 30 percent middle-income, and 50 percent market-rate split.

Opponents still do not believe the changes in the program will produce positive outcomes. IZ units only accounted for 1.7 percent of housing growth between 2005 and 2013, and the new program isn't that different from the old program. Additionally, the inclusionary rents are based on Area Median Income (AMI), which is calculated over an area that includes both the city and its wealthy suburbs. In 2013, AMI for an average household in the New York metro area was \$77,310; in the city alone, however, the average family made \$50,711.

IZ programs also receive a lot of criticism from the residents they are meant to serve due to fears of gentrification. Tom Angotti, the director of the Hunter College Center for Community Planning and Development, argues that inclusionary zoning's proponents "deal with housing as if it existed in a free market—as if it were just a matter of individual apartments combined. But it exists in a land market, where values are determined largely by location and zoning capacity. In areas with high land values, the new inclusionary development will just feed the fire of gentrification."

In New York City, inclusionary zoning could incentivize the destruction of existing affordable housing. Many New York City neighborhoods are filled with rent-control apartments, often at lower densities than the new inclusionary zoning rules would allow. The average income for rent-stabilized tenants is \$37,000; for rent controlled tenants it is \$29,000. Both are significantly lower than the income targets for many inclusionary apartments.

### **Seattle, Washington**

The city of Seattle has turned the fee-in-lieu concept on its head and instead adopted a "fee-first" ordinance that gives residential and commercial developers the option to create onsite or

offsite units in lieu of paying the fee. Between 2002 and 2013, in every case where developers had the choice, they chose to pay the fee.

Cornerstone Partnership analyzed data from Seattle's Office of Housing and found that \$27 million of fee revenue the city generated from 2000 to 2013 enabled it to bring in \$97 million in federal and state housing funds that would not have been invested in Seattle otherwise.

This allowed Seattle to produce an affordable home for each \$50,000 in fee revenue it received. A typical downtown high-rise rental project paid a fee of about \$150,000 for each home that would have been required onsite, a lower cost than producing the affordable unit. For these downtown projects, Seattle could use the fee revenue to produce three times more affordable homes than would have been built onsite.

### **Portland, Oregon**

In December 2016, Portland's City Council enacted a citywide inclusionary housing requirement that all multifamily developments of 20 or more units set aside 20 percent of newly constructed apartments for families earning no more than 80 percent of the region's median household income. This is one of the most stringent inclusionary zoning policies in the country. In other large cities, like Chicago and New York City, the inclusionary zoning policies only apply to projects seeking upzoning, but in Portland, the requirement applies to all new development. Since its enactment, multiple reports have suggested that the program has brought new apartment proposals in Portland to a near standstill. Portland builders raced to get 14,000 apartments approved, which was three times the amount permitted annually during the recent apartment boom, before the new policy went into effect. From 1999 to 2016, Oregon jurisdictions had been prohibited from enacting mandatory inclusionary policies. Home Builders and Realtors sought to continue the prohibition, worried that IZ would hurt local housing markets. To remove some of the barriers to affordable housing development, Oregon SB1051, passed in 2017, expedited the review period for certain qualifying projects with an affordable component, sets objective standards for that review, and tries to make sure developers can achieve the maximum allowable density.

### **Telluride, Colorado**

Telluride had a shortage of affordable units for people who work in the resort town, so they enacted an inclusionary zoning requirement that developers set aside a certain percentage of new construction as affordable. However, the state of Colorado has had a prohibition on rent control since 1980, so a developer building a rental project sued the city of Telluride, saying that requiring him to set aside units at below-market rates was essentially rent control. The case went all the way to the Colorado Supreme Court in 2000 *Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture* and resulted in the decision that the ordinance violated the state prohibition on rent control.

## **Denver, Colorado**

Denver's Inclusionary Housing Ordinance was enacted in 2001, but as of September 2016, it had been repealed. The program required all newly constructed, for-sale housing developments of 30 or more units to make 10 percent of the units affordable for people earning 95 percent AMI or less, depending on what type of building is constructed. Over those 15 years, 1,166 units were built; however, most of them were built in the early years of the ordinance (Denver Office of Economic Development, 2015). The reasons for this include tighter lending standards after the downturn, construction defects liability and requirements, a payment-in-lieu option, the fact that many developers were choosing to build under the threshold to avoid the requirement, effectively lowering the density in some areas, and Telluride. Because of the Telluride decision, the city of Denver can't make developers of apartment buildings include affordable housing, but they can make rental restrictions a voluntary condition of receiving public money for a project.

After realizing that most of the affordable housing built from 2001-2016 came from the funds collected through the fee-in-lieu program, Denver created a new affordable housing plan that focused on building housing with funds coming from a combination of property taxes and fees on new development. On September 21, 2016, Mayor Michael B. Hancock signed Council Bill 16-0625 into city law. The bill creates a dedicated affordable housing fund to help create or preserve affordable homes, funded in part by a linkage fee on commercial and residential development.

## **State of Louisiana**

Both the Louisiana Senate and the Louisiana House Municipal, Parochial and Cultural Affairs Committee recently voted to approve a ban that would forbid local governments from requiring developers to include affordable housing in new developments. The bill is now moving to the full House for approval before going to the Governor's desk. The Louisiana State Constitution prohibits government from regulating or limiting the value of one's property for the economic benefit of a third party. The HBA of Greater New Orleans argued that mandatory IZ does precisely that - the government essentially mandates a forced discount on the owner's units that are required to be held below market value, then allows a selected third-party renter/buyer to enjoy the benefit of that discount. Despite their efforts and the bill passing both the House and the Senate, the Governor ultimately vetoed the bill in favor of affordable housing advocates.

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